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On February 23, 2006, in a press conference to release the White House report on 
lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism Frances Townsend said “[The president] demanded that 
we find out the lessons, that we learn them and that we fix the problems, that we take 
every action to make sure America is safer, stronger and better prepared.” The lessons 
Townsend called out in her briefing concerned planning, resource management, 
evacuation, situational awareness, communications, and coordination. No one in the 
emergency response community was surprised. We know these are the problem areas. 
We knew they would be before Katrina ever hit the Gulf coast. Why? Because we identify 
the same lessons again and again, incident after incident. 
In fact, responders can readily predict the problems that will arise in a major 
incident and too often their predictions are borne out in practice. Even a casual observer 
can spot problems that recur: communications systems fail, command and control 
structures are fractured, resources are slow to be deployed. A quick perusal of the 
reports published after the major incidents of the past decade quickly shows this to be 
true. Consider the following: 
Hurricane Katrina, 2005  
In terms of the management of the Federal response, our architecture of 
command and control mechanisms as well as our existing structure of plans did 
not serve us well. Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and elsewhere in the Federal government had unclear, and often 
overlapping, roles and responsibilities that were exposed as flawed during this 
disaster…This lack of coordination at the Federal headquarters-level reflected 
confusing organizational structures in the field…Furthermore, the JFO [Joint 
Field Office] staff and other deployed Federal personnel often lacked a working 
knowledge of NIMS [the National Incident Management System] or even a basic 
understanding of ICS [Incident Command System] principles.  
 – From The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 2006: 52 
September 11 attack, 2001 
It is a fair inference, given the differing situations in New York City and Northern 
Virginia, that the problems in command, control, and communications that 
occurred at both sites will likely recur in any emergency of similar scale. The task 
looking forward is to enable first responders to respond in a coordinated manner 
with the greatest possible awareness of the situation…Emergency response 
agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS).When 
multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a 
unified command. Both are proven frameworks for emergency response. 
– From The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 315, 397 
Oklahoma City bombing, 1995 
The Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) and Incident Command 
System (ICS) were weakened early in the event due to the immediate response of 
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numerous local, state and federal agencies, three separate locations of the 
Incident Command Post (ICP), within the first few hours, and the deployment of 
many Mobile Command Posts (MCPs), representing support agencies. 
– From the After Action Report: Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing, 2003: 3 
Hurricane Andrew, 1992 
The Committee heard substantial testimony that the post-disaster response and 
recovery to Hurricane Andrew suffered from several problems, including: 
inadequate communication between levels of government concerning specific 
needs; lack of full awareness of supply inventories and agency capabilities; failure 
to have a single person in charge with a clear chain of command; and inability to 
cut through bureaucratic red tape. 
 – From the Governor’s Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee Final 
Report, 1993: 60 
As these statements reveal, we repeatedly confront command and control issues in large 
incidents. These are but a few examples from dozens of reports that cite the need for 
sound command structures. Somehow, though, we fail to learn this and other crucial 
lessons that have been identified in after-action reports for decades. The central 
concerns of this paper are why that is so and how we can improve. We report here on an 
exploratory investigation that targets six research questions.  
1. Is it true that lessons recur?  
2. What lessons are persistently identified?  
3. Why do these lessons continue to be identified as important?  
4. Why are these lessons so hard to learn? (That is, why do agencies have difficulty 
devising and implementing corrective actions once lessons are identified?)  
5. How do lessons-learned processes work?   
6. How can they be improved? 
We believe that by explicitly identifying persistent challenges, responders may be better 
attuned to these challenges and more able to address them in their planning and 
training processes. Likewise, by better understanding why these challenges remain 
unresolved, responders may be able to adapt their lessons-learned processes to better 
support behavioral change and improvement. To these ends, we have conducted a 
qualitative analysis of response organizations’ perspectives on lessons and learning. The 
next section describes the context of emergency response learning. We then explain our 
investigative approach. Following that we present and discuss our findings about what 
lessons responders struggle with most and what learning approaches they use. We 
conclude with recommendations for improving these processes. 
 
DISASTERS AND LEARNING 
Disasters are devastating natural, accidental, or willful events that suddenly result in 
severe negative economic and social consequences for the populations they affect, often 
including physical injury, loss of life, property damage and loss, physical and emotional 
hardship, destruction of physical infrastructure, and failure of administrative and 
operational systems. Emergency managers and responders are responsible for 
intervening before and during such events, to minimize the harm disasters cause and to 
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restore order. The large scale, high complexity, profound urgency, and intense scrutiny 
that attend disasters provide a powerful motivation for responders to be good at 
response. 
To address this challenge, responders use their experience to develop systematized 
strategies they can follow when the chaos of disaster erupts. At the same time, the 
infrequency with which disasters occur makes it hard for responders to test and improve 
their strategies, to ensure that they can be counted on to mitigate threats and hazards 
predictably and to resolve their consequences effectively. The appeal of learning from 
experience – both to avoid duplicating mistakes and to be able to repeat successes – is 
widely perceived, and many organizations across the emergency response disciplines 
have formal procedures for identifying, documenting, and disseminating lessons from 
incidents in hopes that they and others will be able to learn from past experience and 
improve future responses. 
Various mechanisms for sharing experience have emerged. These mechanisms are 
generally termed “lessons-learned” processes, and include tools like in-progress reviews, 
after-action reviewing and reporting, “hotwashes,” and various kinds of debriefings. 
While these processes vary, they have the common goal of sharing performance 
information in order to prevent the recurrence of adverse events and actions and to 
better contend with situations and problems that are likely to arise again. Most 
processes involve some version of three core components: 1. Evaluating an incident 
(through systematic analysis of what happened and why); 2. Identifying lessons 
(strengths to be sustained and weaknesses to be corrected); and 3. Learning (specifying 
and inculcating behavioral changes consistent with the lessons). 
Examples of lessons-learned systems abound. One of the best known is the U.S. 
Army’s After Action Review (AAR), a comprehensive reflective learning process 
developed in the 1970s.1 Many emergency responders follow the AAR template to a 
greater or lesser extent, formally or informally. Post-incident reporting is a common 
practice whereby an agency or set of agencies documents what happened during a 
disaster or exercise. These reports usually include accounts of actions and results, as 
well as potential remedies to problems encountered. While these reports are often used 
internally by the agencies that generate them, they are often written in isolation by a 
single agency, rather than through a coherent inter-agency process. There are various 
collections of lessons that have been compiled for broader distribution. Prominent 
examples include the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center collection and the recently 
established Lessons Learned Information System (developed by the memorial Institute 
for the Prevention of Terrorism and sponsored by the Department of Homeland 
Security).  
Despite these widespread activities, however, the term “lessons learned” is often a 
misnomer. Our experience suggests that purported lessons learned are not really 
learned; many problems and mistakes are repeated in subsequent events. It appears 
that while review of incidents and the identification of lessons are more readily 
accomplished, true learning is much more difficult. Reports and lessons are often 
ignored,2 and even when they are not, lessons are too often isolated and perishable, 
rather than generalized and institutionalized. 
METHODOLOGY 
To determine whether or not our instinct is correct – that emergency response 
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organizations find it difficult to learn certain lessons – and to better understand why 
this is the case, we decided to conduct an exploratory analysis. We used three qualitative 
approaches in our investigation: interviews, a review of documents, and a focus group 
retreat. We began our study with a series of informal interviews with experienced 
emergency responders to confirm the face validity of our hypothesis that important 
lessons are repeatedly identified and to verify that this was a compelling concern for 
emergency responders. We then reviewed reports produced following incidents to 
discover and classify lessons that are identified repeatedly. We included reports from 
large incidents of all types that occurred within the past two decades. We excluded 
reports from military operations and from exercises. In many cases, individual 
organizations prepare their own reports, and so there are often several reports available 
for a given incident. In these cases, we focused on the reports prepared at the 
government level, rather than at the agency level, often by the department (or office) of 
emergency management, but sometimes by an independent analyst or commission. The 
reports we reviewed are listed in Appendix A. 
Some reports were very general, identifying major issues and general lessons. Many, 
though, were very detailed and the descriptions and explanations provided were very 
particular to the incident at hand. Because we are interested in high-level, cross-cutting 
lessons, we confined our examination to lessons that were called out in an executive 
summary (if provided) or that were in some way highlighted as significant in the body of 
the report. Our review of these reports can best be characterized as systematic, but 
informal. That is, we did not apply formal coding schemes or use sophisticated textual 
analysis methods. While this would certainly be an interesting avenue for further 
analysis, our purpose was to determine whether significant lessons were common across 
reports.  
Finally, we convened a focus group of eleven expert incident managers who could 
reflect on the persistent concerns that arise during major disasters. Most participants 
were chief-level officers. All were from major U.S. municipalities. All participants had 
significant senior-level management experience dealing with large scale incidents. 
Examples of incidents they had managed include: Hurricane Katrina (2005), the 
Columbia space shuttle crash (2003), the anthrax and ricin attacks in Washington, D.C. 
(2001), the September 11th attacks at both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
(2001), the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 (2001), the bombing of the Murrah 
Building in Oklahoma City (1995), the Northridge earthquake (1994), the World Trade 
Organization protests (1991), the Air Florida plane crash, as well as numerous other 
“civil” events such as presidential inaugurations, national political conventions, protests, 
major sports championships, Mardis Gras celebrations, and a multitude of natural 
disasters including wildfires, hurricanes, and tornados. Participants represented a range 
of emergency response disciplines including municipal and wildland firefighting, law 
enforcement, emergency medical services, urban search and rescue, and hazardous 
materials response. A list of the participants is provided in Appendix B. 
During an intensive full-day retreat, we conducted a facilitated discussion to elicit 
the perspectives of these managers on our research questions. We had two primary 
objectives. First, we sought independent confirmation of the classes of lessons we 
discovered in our review of AAR’s. To accomplish this we simply asked participants 
what major lessons seemed to come up repeatedly in their experience. Second, we 
wanted to elicit their beliefs about why these lessons were repeated rather than learned. 
DONAHUE & TUOHY, LESSONS WE DON’T LEARN                                                                                                                                                                     5 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 2 (JULY 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
We asked them a series of open-ended questions about why lessons are hard to learn, 
how lessons are identified and reported, and what mechanisms are used to prompt 
learning. Three note-takers independently documented the discussion that ensued. 
Participants were also afforded the opportunity to provide additional commentary to 
clarify or expand points they wanted to make.  
 
FINDINGS: WHAT LESSONS ARE IDENTIFIED REPEATEDLY? 
To reiterate, we sought to be systematic in our analysis, but this remains an exploratory 
investigation – a first step in an area we hope to probe further in a more targeted way. 
The findings we report in this section were garnered both deductively (proceeding from 
loosely-specified hypotheses) and inductively (in that new and unexpected insights 
surfaced and added to our inquiry). Our findings are admittedly subject to the biases 
inherent in subjective, qualitative research. We hope to mitigate this threat by citing the 
perspectives of our participants directly, so that the reader can “hear” how these 
individuals characterized the issues at hand. Thus we report here our synthesized 
findings accompanied by illustrations from the discussions we held. 
Our review of AAR’s bears out our hypothesis that lessons are repeatedly identified. 
Despite the disparity of the reports we reviewed, we found a striking consistency in 
major categories of lessons identified. Table 1 shows important topics that were 
addressed in several prominent incidents. While it is certainly the case that each 
incident had its own unique challenges, it was common to see problems characterized in 
similar ways across several incidents. It is also true that the response to some incidents 
appeared to go well while the response to others went badly, so that certain lessons were 
stated as successes to be repeated in some cases but as problems to be corrected in 
others. A detailed list of the lessons identified in a selection of reports for significant 
recent incidents is available from the authors. 
 




































































Communications     ● ● ●   ● ● 
Leadership ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Logistics ● ●   ● ● ● ●   
Mental Health         ●   ● ● 
Planning ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Public Relations ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Operations   ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Resource Management ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Training & Exercises ● ● ● ● ●   ●   
 
Table 1: Common Categories of Lessons.  
Correlation between After Action Reports from selected major incidents and significant issues addressed. 
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We gain added confidence in our hypothesis that these lessons recur from the responses 
of our focus group. The focus group participants were easily able to identify lessons that 
emerge regularly from incident responses. There was a very high level of consensus 
among participants about what these lessons are, and the lessons they identified are 
very consistent with those we identified from our AAR review. The lessons our incident 
managers singled out as important and recurring pertain to five main areas: command, 
communications, planning, resource management, and public relations.  
 
Uncoordinated Leadership 
We asked our incident commander focus group “what problems do you see on every 
incident?” Several incident commanders immediately replied: unclear, multiple, 
conflicting, uncooperative, and isolated command structures. Every head in the room 
nodded agreement. Large incidents demand that robust command and control 
structures emerge out of the initial chaos that inevitably ensues when disasters strike. 
Large incidents also involve a multitude of agencies, each of which must direct its own 
resources. As a result, agency- and/or function-specific command structures proliferate. 
Since each agency has legitimate missions, responsibilities, and jurisdiction, each uses 
its command and control process to take charge, in a legitimate attempt to solve the 
problems the agency is supposed to solve. Absent an overarching command structure to 
which all participants subscribe, however, the result is duplicative and conflicting 
efforts. As one responder put it, “People ask ‘who’s in charge?’ The response is usually, 
‘Of what?’” In fact, a coherent joint command structure often fails to emerge; our focus 
group specifically cited weak implementation of the incident command system (ICS) 
and poor understanding of unified command. A fire chief with extensive experience at 
the Katrina response gave a telling example: “In New Orleans, you couldn’t go two 
blocks without running into somebody’s incident command post. But there was no 
coordination between them. Everyone assumes there’ll be a graduation up to some 
larger structure, but nobody knows how to get to that.” At the same time, by using the 
term “command and control,” we do not mean to suggest that structures are unitary, 
rigid, or static. In fact, successful management requires collaboration, flexibility, and 
adaptability across multiple diverse actors. This cannot be achieved anarchically, 
however; it requires that managers employ common philosophies and conventions.  
What accounts for command problems, for failure to collaborate? Our emergency 
response experts cited three main culprits. First, they said, agencies lack the 
commitment to coordinate with each other. At best, they are unaware of what other 
agencies are doing and do not try to find out. At worst, they are unwilling to cooperate. 
This stems from a lack of trust between agencies and a lack of understanding across 
disciplines. Moreover, agencies often find themselves in competition. Day-to-day they 
fight with each other for scarce budget resources. This battle worsens during a major 
disaster when resources become even scarcer. Second, responders told us that the 
primary mechanism for resolving resource-allocation struggles, the Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC), is often ineffective. The delegates sent to EOCs are usually 
liaisons who lack decision-making authority, aren’t respected, and/or don’t get along 
with each other. They do not focus on how to make decisions together. Worse, large 
incidents spawn multiple EOCs that tend to be political and parochial – they will not 
exchange representatives to facilitate coordination. As a result, “turf battles” rage and 
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distract incident managers from the real job at hand: mitigating the incident.  
Finally, our experts told us, ICS is in common use, but it is not understood and 
implemented in a consistent manner. Generally, every discipline does their own form of 
ICS training and agencies train in isolation. Often this training is too simplistic to delve 
into the subtle skills of disciplined, team-based, decision making. Further, responders 
cannot be expected to learn the functions of incident management in the heat of an 
event. As one captain told us, “You can’t grab ‘regular’ police officers and firefighters 
and take them away from handling the stuff they’re handling to do incident 
management stuff. If they haven’t already been training in logistics, it will take them a 
long time to figure it out, and they have other things to be worrying about.” Yet, absent 
sound training, this is exactly what happens, with the needless result that recognized 
and well-developed incident management functions are carried out poorly. The reports 
cited in the introduction to this article bear out our focus group participants’ claim that, 
as one manager put it, “Everyone agrees we need ICS, but we don’t share one system.” 
 
Failed Communications 
Our systems of command, control, and coordination are predicated on being able to 
communicate. As one expert told us, “For thirty years, we’ve said that communications 
is our biggest problem because it’s a house of cards: When communications fails, the 
rest of the response fails.” A major challenge of large disasters is that they destroy our 
physical infrastructure, including our communications equipment. The most recent 
example of this comes from Hurricane Katrina, which “destroyed an unprecedented 
portion of the core communications infrastructure throughout the Gulf Coast region... 
The complete devastation of the communications infrastructure left emergency 
responders and citizens without a reliable network across which they could coordinate.”3 
But communications isn’t entirely (or even fundamentally) a technology problem. 
We know how to build robust equipment and systems; as one participant noted, “CNN 
never goes down.” And even sophisticated interoperable capability exists. But our 
response professionals pointed to an unwillingness to agree to a shared system, a lack of 
commitment to operate using this system, and a lack of discipline to use it correctly. As 
one chief pointed out, “We dump millions into hardware, but don’t think about systems. 
Hardware will do anything you want. You’ve got to get people to agree on how to 
function with it.” In short, technology is only an enabler; communicating requires that 
people are willing to share information with each other. This is not to say there are no 
important technological weaknesses in our communications systems. In part, 
communications deficiencies stem from gaps in research and development, from 
resource constraints, and from problems making some technologies broadly available. 
As one responder lamented, “We can talk to a rover on Mars, but we can’t talk to 
someone inside a building.” Despite being aware of the limitations and fragility of the 
infrastructure, we continue to lack contingency plans for how to communicate when 
technology fails (or is destroyed).  
 
Weak Planning 
Gaps in emergency plans cause serious problems when disaster strikes. Witness the 
evacuation problems experienced in New Orleans: Thousands of people had no way to 
leave the city on their own and no place to go, leaving them stranded in the face of 
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Katrina. This problem was anticipated, yet the city’s evacuation plan was woefully 
inadequate. While it mentioned evacuation, it lacked details about how evacuation 
would be conducted and who was responsible for the process, while some people who 
were assigned roles by the plan were unaware of their responsibilities. This is a 
prominent example, but not atypical of the response plans on which this nation relies. 
Plans are often simplistic and superficial, failing to provide enough detail to be 
actionable. Often plans cover the first hours or days of an incident, but do not consider 
long-duration responses or long-term recovery. 
These gaps are a result of weaknesses in the planning process. The most 
fundamental problem to plague planning processes is a lack of commitment to plans 
across agencies and jurisdictions. While agencies may be at the table during the 
planning process, they may not buy in to the requirements needed to fully enact these 
plans. Alternatively, plans may be watered down to permit compromise, rather than 
requiring hard choices. Decisions about how work will get done are necessarily decisions 
about who has authority and who gets resources. These can be hard conflicts to resolve, 
and agencies often shirk making these hard choices when they are not perceived as 
immediately pressing. Worse, key agencies may be excluded from the planning process, 
even though the plan governs them or counts on their support. These problems are 
exacerbated by the fact that planning processes are typically infrequent, so plans 
become dated and do not incorporate lessons from recent events. 
Ultimately these weaknesses go unnoticed because actual plans are not trained fully 
or exercised realistically. Plans are often developed by mid-level managers. Senior 
managers and political officials may have the plan on their shelves, but get no formal 
training on what is in it or how to use it. Similarly, plans are not disseminated to 
supervisors or training academies. When the time comes for implementation, those on 
the front lines don’t know what the plan calls for.  
 
Resource Constraints 
Large-scale, long-duration incidents demand more resources – personnel, equipment, 
supplies, commodities, specialized capabilities – than any agency or government can 
keep on hand, so these resources must be obtained rapidly when a disaster occurs. This 
makes resource acquisition and management a major function of incident management. 
Unfortunately, while some materials are cached and pre-deployed, they are often 
inadequate to meet actual need. This means that resources must be obtained “real-
time,” but normal resource acquisition systems are too slow and are not designed to 
obtain large amounts of supplies rapidly. The capacity and flexibility of emergency 
requisition and purchasing procedures are uneven. Bid laws and ordering processes may 
be too cumbersome and constraining to permit responders to get what they need. 
Governments often lack standing contracts and agreements for specialized resources. 
Once materials are obtained, poor property-tracking systems leave response agencies 
vulnerable to public accountability problems and lawsuits. 
Remedies to these problems do exist, but they are not broadly implemented. For 
example, there are one-stop-shop mechanisms available (such as those of the General 
Services Administration), but these are neither widely understood nor widely used, and 
the procedures involved must be pre-arranged. Mutual aid relationships can be an 
effective conduit for support, but these are often informal and are not centrally 
coordinated. As a result, a single mutual aid asset may be “counted” by several different 
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agencies as part of their resource bases. The wildland fire community uses a very 
effective nationwide resource ordering and deployment system, but this approach has 
not been replicated by other disciplines. Moreover, common terminology and standard 
resource typing are required for such a system to work; these do not yet exist across 
response disciplines. 
Volunteers and donated resources present a particular challenge to incident 
management. Tracking systems for these resources are weak, and as a result many 
assets go underutilized. Many organizations have useful capabilities but do not know 
how to identify or connect to the incident management system, either because they do 
not understand ICS or because the command system is so fractured it is hard to 
navigate. Even emergency response agencies that do understand ICS often “self-
dispatch” to the scene without coordinating their response. These agencies have 
important skills, but often deploy without the ability to support themselves with food, 
water, fuel, shelter, or communications. Also, it is hard to verify the credentials of 
personnel who show up to help; some are highly qualified, while others have no business 
being at an emergency scene. Yet there is no easy, standard way to confirm the 
background and affiliation of volunteers. Likewise, maintaining accountability and 
tracking volunteer status is equally difficult. As a result, well-meaning volunteers add a 
significant management burden to already over-taxed incident managers. As noted in 
Arlington County’s report after 9/11, “Organizations, response units, and individuals 
proceeding on their own initiative directly to an incident site, without the knowledge 
and permission of the host jurisdiction and the Incident Commander, complicate the 
exercise of command, increase the risks faced by bona fide responders, and exacerbate 
the challenge of accountability.”4 On top of these problems, much of the material sent to 
the scene is not useful, but must still be managed – transported, stored, and disposed of. 
Agencies often lack plans for getting rid of stuff they receive but do not need. 
 
Poor Public Relations 
Responders told us they believe that the general public wants instructions about what to 
do, but that people may not receive or understand the directions government agencies 
give them. In part, responders say, this is because governments rely heavily on 
mainstream media. Many people don’t pay attention to mainstream media, and 
therefore don’t get the information governments want them to have. Even people who 
do get the information may not understand the message correctly, especially when the 
government gives short shrift to pre-incident public education. This problem is 
exacerbated in the heat of an incident – when agencies fail to use a common message,  
do not control the message carefully, the pressure to get information out quickly 
undermines accuracy, and rumors propagate unchecked.  
Even when directions are clear, received, and understood, some people do not have 
the wherewithal to follow them. As our incident managers acknowledged, some people 
just do not have the will to do as they are told. In the incident managers’ view, the public 
is generally complacent about preparedness. This is borne out by anecdotal evidence. 
For example, during the recent commemoration of the 1906 earthquake, National Public 
Radio reported, “Scientists agree that it’s very likely another big earthquake will hit the 
San Francisco Bay area in the next thirty years, but…many people in the Bay Area still 
live in denial” (April 18, 2006). Interviews with a number of citizens illustrated their 
point. Few had serious plans or any supplies to sustain them in the event of a major 
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disaster. The lack of wherewithal or will on the part of the public presents a recurring 
challenge to governments that have not invested enough resources in emergency 
transportation and shelter. 
 
FINDINGS: WHY DON’T WE LEARN? 
These lessons relate to some of the most important and involved functions of incident 
management, so it is no surprise that problems are identified repeatedly in the areas of 
command, communications, planning, resource management, and public relations. 
Likewise, responders are most likely to notice concerns in these areas by dint of the 
effort expended on them during any incident. Moreover, large, complex incidents are 
inherently challenging to manage. Destructive and unpredictable, they impose 
extraordinary demands on the decision-making and service-delivery systems of the 
affected communities. Nevertheless, responders claim that many problems encountered 
repeatedly are solved anew each time, suggesting that it should be possible to inculcate 
improvements across time and agencies. It should be possible to solve at least some of 
these problems once and for all, rather than time and again. This section reports 
findings that illuminate the challenges to this proposition in five general areas: 
motivation, reporting, learning, exercising, and resources. 
Motivation for Change 
Learning is, at its core, a process of growth; thus a successful learning process requires a 
commitment to change.5 Organizational change is notoriously difficult, but particular 
challenges attend change in the emergency response arena. One challenge is political 
traction. Individual citizens rarely see their emergency response systems in action. They 
generally assume the systems will work well when called upon. Moreover, citizens 
underestimate the likelihood that disaster will befall them. Yet citizens are confronted 
every day by other problems they want government to fix – failing schools, blighted 
communities, and high fuel prices. Politicians tend to respond to these more 
immediately pressing demands, deferring investments in emergency preparedness until 
a major event re-awakens public concern. As one incident commander put it, “Change 
decisions are driven by politics and scrutiny, not rational analysis.” High-profile events 
and the media attention they garner generate opportunities to make changes because 
public fear prompts politicians to support improvements. 
Scrutiny can free up resources for change, but the results can be perverse as well. 
Until Hurricane Katrina struck, the most momentous event in the public’s memory was 
the 9/11 attack. On the basis of that incident, the president and Congress initiated a 
major new homeland security policy agenda, including one of the most significant 
government reorganizations in history. Many of the policies and programs promulgated 
under the auspices of homeland security are targeted at Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) and terrorism. This frustrates emergency responders who continue to struggle 
to maintain and upgrade their capacity to cope with a myriad of other (more common) 
threats and hazards. Our experts’ frustration on this point was palpable. They find the 
WMD focus distracting. As one fire chief raged, “It’s terrorism, terrorism, 
terrorism…and I can’t use my resources for the things I know I’ll face. So how many 
major non-terrorism incidents do we have to have before DHS get us resources for other 
things than WMD?” A police chief agreed: “Local agencies are having terrorism shoved 
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down their throats. They can hardly do basic tactical training because of all the 
mandates for certifications, much less terrorism training.” 
Even following a major event, it is hard to sustain a commitment to change long 
enough to accomplish it. After an incident, it takes time to conduct an analysis and 
identify lessons. Washington D.C. and the public have very short time horizons; neither 
waits for these reports to move ahead. The government  tends to focus on fast (and 
inexpensive) solutions – quick wins they can point to before public attention wanes. 
This kind of nearsightedness is inconsistent with meaningful change. By the time 
reports come out, there is no will (nor funding) to implement changes. By then, 
leadership has either turned over or moved on to something else. One local manager 
told us “We thought we did a lot of work with our politicians after the last major 
incident. But they have better things to do. Five minutes after that incident is over, 
they’re on to something else. There are a lot of gains to be made if they do well 
[managing a disaster], but an incident is a political flash in the pan for them.”  
Even in cases where important lessons do make it to the public agenda, the disparate 
emergency response community lacks a shared vision of what to do about those lessons. 
Response professionals see desired outcomes differently based on what agencies and 
disciplines they represent. Our focus group claims this problem has gotten harder since 
9/11, because federal involvement in trying to solve problems is so much greater. The 
federal government has many resources to devote to policy and planning relative to local 
governments, who do not have much capacity. On the other hand, it is the locals who 
deliver services, are closest to the needs of the community, and best understand how to 
meet those needs, whereas federal agencies are removed from the exigencies of 
emergency response operations. As a result, federal and local agencies talk past each 
other. Even in cases where federal and local policymakers see problems the same way, 
federal ambition outstrips local capacity; federal agencies do extensive planning, but 
there are not enough local resources to meet the federal vision. 
Another impediment to change is the episodic nature of significant events. Any given 
agency experiences incidents fairly infrequently, but looking at the nation as a whole, 
relevant events occur all the time. For the nation to improve response overall, the 
emergency response community has to be able to learn from all of these events. This 
calls for organizations to think of their experiences collectively, and be willing to learn 
from each other. But it can be difficult for agencies to perceive the experience of others 
as relevant to their own responsibilities and operations, and it can be hard to prioritize 
these lessons over the daily problems an agency confronts in its own jurisdiction. One 
chief told us, “There [are] no teeth in lessons from someone else’s experience. We don’t 
really learn from others unless we can really imagine ourselves in that other person’s 
circumstance.” Another explained the problem this way:  
We fail to recognize and apply the lessons on a daily basis. We kill firefighters over 
and over again the same way, report after report after report. We look for big 
lessons, but fail to identify the small ones and apply them in ‘onesies’ and ‘twosies’ 
every day. Why? We don’t see the relevance, or think it won’t happen here, or we’re 
too parochial. We’re tone-deaf to things that happen to other organizations. 
Distance in time and space makes this worse. As we get further from each other and 
the event gets further in the past, it is easy to ignore it. And, even if you accept that 
something needs to be done, how do you manage it with everything else that’s 
coming at you as a priority every day? Small lessons just don’t take priority. 
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Beyond this, it seems that pressure for change from within the discipline does not have 
the same force as external scrutiny. As we have said, public fear can motivate rapid 
behavioral change. An example that members of the focus group pointed to was the 
transformation in the active-shooter doctrine that resulted from the Columbine High 
School shooting. The protocol changed dramatically in eighteen months, and the change 
was universal – all S.W.A.T. teams in the country updated their procedures.  
Why did such a sweeping change happen so fast on the basis of a single incident? 
There were three reasons. First, public scrutiny; every community had a school full of 
kids whose parents were afraid. Second, willingness to admit to an important lesson; the 
Columbine Police Department stood up and said, “We didn’t handle this right.” Third, 
rapid dissemination; the new protocol was sent to every department across the country 
through the law enforcement information network. Our focus group participants 
contrasted this example with the fact that it took five years and a lot of firefighter deaths 
to get Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) established, even though many in the field knew 
they were necessary.  
All of this suggests that thinking about learning and change in a single agency or 
discipline faces substantial barriers. Doing this work collectively is even harder, 
especially when long-standing animosity gets in the way. It is common for agencies to 
compete for attention and resources daily, and this only gets worse with big incidents. 
But one chief acknowledged that collaboration is a key enabler of learning. As he said, 
“If you’re not alone in this game it’s a lot easier. If you’re learning alongside others who 
face the same problems and will be your partners in a major incident, then you’re more 
likely to obtain broader, more persistent change because you change expectations across 
organizations.” 
 
Review and Reporting Process 
Assuming that an agency is open to learning and change, the learning process can be 
thought of as beginning with the identification of lessons. This is typically accomplished 
through the publication of After Action Reports (AARs). Our response experts told us 
that while some reports are very comprehensive and useful, lessons reporting processes 
are, on the whole, ad hoc. There is no universally accepted approach to the development 
or content of reports. Moreover, there are often several reports that come out of any 
given incident. Sometimes joint reports are prepared, but more often agencies or 
disciplines write their own without consulting each other. These reports differ and even 
conflict, since perspectives and experiences (even from very reliable sources) vary 
dramatically, so that “sometimes you wonder if people were on the same incident.” It is 
difficult for an agency seeking to learn from the reports to de-conflict them, since there 
is no independent validation mechanism to establish whether findings and lessons are 
“right.”  
Worse than conflicts and possible inaccuracies, concern about attribution and 
retribution is a severe constraint on candor in lessons reporting. It is politically 
dangerous for an agency or a leader to own up to mistakes and problems for fear that 
the leader or agency will be penalized. To contend with this, lessons are often reported 
in a much redacted way; as a result, the level of detail required to make a lesson 
meaningful and actionable is lost. Meaning is also diluted by the lack of a common 
terminology. The same functions are described using different terms in different 
disciplines and parts of the country. Or the same terms are used to describe different 
DONAHUE & TUOHY, LESSONS WE DON’T LEARN                                                                                                                                                                     13 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 2 (JULY 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
things. This leads to a lack of understanding, or a false sense of understanding. 
Another substantive problem is that the focus of reporting is unbalanced. AARs 
typically focus on what went wrong, but chiefs want to know what they can do that is 
right. Reports tend to detail things that didn’t work, without necessarily proposing 
solutions. Incident managers seek a lessons-learned system that provides good answers, 
solutions, and best practices. They want to hear what to do, instead of what not to do. 
They would also like to hear about “near misses,” things that almost went wrong and 
could go wrong again elsewhere without preventive action. This kind of reporting 
requires an additional analytical step; to produce reports that meet these needs, those 
preparing the reports need to understand not only what happened, but also why it 
happened and what corrective action would have improved the circumstances. Reports 
of this depth and quality are relatively rare. Beyond this, many opportunities to learn 
smaller but valuable lessons are foregone because formal reports are typically only 
generated for major events, not for small day-to-day incidents. These “less significant” 
lessons, if disseminated, offer important opportunities to make more manageable 
developmental changes in response procedures, but there is no mechanism by which 
these smaller lessons can be easily reported and widely shared.  
The value of even well-crafted reports is often undermined because they are not 
distributed effectively. Most dissemination is informal, and as a result development and 
adoption of new practices is haphazard. Generally, responders must actively seek 
reports in order to obtain them. Lessons do get reported at conferences, but these 
discussions rarely trickle down to the front line. There is no trusted, accessible facility or 
institution that provides lessons learned information to first responders broadly, 
although some disciplines do have lessons repositories. (The Wildland Fire Lessons 
Learned Center and the Center for Army Lessons Learned are two prominent examples.) 
And there are some consolidated collections of reports that attempt to fill this need. 
(See, for example, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s Lessons 
Learned Information Sharing web site.6)  
 
Learning and Teaching 
Failure to learn is due, in part, to a lack of systems to identify and disseminate lessons. 
Even when lessons are identified, our response experts told us, most learning and 
change processes lack a formal, rigorous, systematic methodology. Simplistically, the 
lesson learning and change process iterates through the following steps: Identify the 
lesson  recognize the causal process  devise a new operational process  practice 
the new process  embed/institutionalize and sustain the new process.7 It is apparent 
in practice that there are weaknesses at each of these steps. 
Learning begins with an analysis to identify the causal process that underlies the 
lesson. Absent this, there can be no confidence that a remedy will work and this kind of 
analysis is rare. One manager explained, “We don’t study lessons carefully enough and 
apply them in a serious way. We don’t drill down into the details of what changes are 
really required to address lessons.” In particular, our incident managers told us that 
agencies find it difficult to think in general terms to be able to see how lessons from one 
incident or discipline might apply to another. This dilemma is intensified by the fact that 
the emergency response disciplines writ large lack a common operating doctrine. 
Without common, accepted conventions against which to compare behavior, it is hard to 
spot deviations and inconsistencies that suggest the need for learning and change. 
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Moreover, agencies tend to consider individual incidents and particular lessons in 
isolation, rather than as systems or broad patterns of behavior. A chief put it this way: 
“We don’t look enough at the relationships of components. Day to day, we focus too 
narrowly and short-term, so our problem-solving approach doesn’t consider the whole 
system.”  
Following the analysis through which lessons are identified and appropriate 
remedies understood, practice is required to inculcate new behavior. Often the work of 
identifying relevant lessons and devising corrective actions makes the agency feel it now 
knows what to do. One responder admitted, “We spend a lot of time writing AAR’s, 
which gives us the sense that we learned lessons, but the lessons are not consolidated 
into a training regimen, and so we don’t actually learn them.” Our focus group 
participants agreed that practice gets shortchanged. As a result, the link between the last 
two steps in the learning process seems especially tenuous. Agencies that do get to the 
point of practicing a new process are lulled into a false sense that they have now 
corrected the problem. But when another stressful event happens, it turns out this new 
process is not as firmly embedded as the agency thought. “We feel committed to new 
courses of action, but then they fall apart on exercises, much less incidents.” A lack of 
practice means that processes have not been rehearsed well enough to work out details 
and problems, or to develop trust in the new process. Since responders do not really 
understand and trust the new process, they revert to their old familiar ways. These old 
habits seem “safer,” even though past experience has shown they do not work. One chief 
described this pathology as follows: “Lessons represent dramatic changes that are hard 
to entrench. So we fail because we’re not disciplined enough, and we fall back to old 
habits rather than sticking to what we learned.” 
This problem is rarely noticed until another event occurs because follow-up is 
inadequate. Our experts told us that feedback after implementing new practices is 
typically informal and passive; it comes from simply noticing improvement, rather than 
actively testing for it. One responder summed up the problem: “There are breaks 
throughout the cycle. Even if we could identify lessons, identify corrective actions, 
implement them, train them, and exercise them, how do we know if the changes solved 
the problem?” Lessons are not clearly linked to corrective actions, then to training 
objectives, then to performance metrics, so it is difficult for organizations to notice that 
they have not really learned until the next incident hits and they get surprised. As an 
Oklahoma City Chief told us about his experience after the Murrah Building bombing, 
“We’d been through a major incident, and when the next one was inbound, we thought 
we were ready, thought we’d learned and knew what to do. Then the incident hits and 
we have the same problems all over again. Turned out we didn’t really learn what we 
thought we had.”  Responders from New Orleans echoed this sentiment: “We did Mardi 
Gras so well that Katrina felt like a sucker punch.” 
According to our focus group experts, fixing the weak links in the lessons learning 
cycle requires that response agencies have a deeper understanding of how to learn. But, 
they say, the learning process is not taught in our emergency response educational 
institutions. For example, the National Fire Academy (our premiere institution of 
learning in the fire service) doesn’t teach learning science or systems thinking at any 
level of sophistication. Our emergency response agency leaders especially need this 
knowledge. One manager highlighted this need: “We don’t know if we are even creating 
the mechanism appropriate to learning in our agencies.” 
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Perhaps the key mechanism for testing, practicing, refining, and inculcating new 
lessons-derived behaviors is exercising. Almost every AAR discusses the crucial role that 
training and exercising play in building capacity. Unfortunately, our AAR review and 
focus group betrayed several important weaknesses in the way disaster exercises are 
designed and executed. 
One design problem is striking the right balance between the known and the 
unknown. On the one hand, it is very important to prepare for what is likely. But 
preparing for the events that will probably occur does not get responders ready for the 
unusual, unexpected, and unforeseen, and how to handle these kinds of circumstances. 
One chief asserted that “we don’t use our imagination in preparedness,” but also 
acknowledged the opposite problem: some exercise scenarios are so far-fetched that 
they are a waste of time. At the same time, responders, like citizens, would rather believe 
that the possible worst case just will not happen. This kind of denial stems in part from 
the fact that it is important for emergency responders to have confidence and courage in 
the face of extreme adversity. One incident manager explained: “The hardest thing is to 
train a firefighter or a cop to know that they’re overwhelmed. They are trained to feel 
like they can handle it. It’s a rude awakening to recognize your own mortality, but we’ve 
got to.” 
Another design problem is a lack of realism, not with respect to scenarios, but in 
terms of what is required of responders and incident managers. Exercise procedures are 
typically simplified, compared to how they would actually unfold in a real event, in order 
to meet the time and resource limitations of exercises. This masks complexity, however, 
and responders often fail to appreciate what it really takes to get work done; when 
reality hits, “the devil is in the details.” One senior leader explained, “In planning and 
exercising, everything works nicely, but this doesn’t happen in the real world.” This lack 
of realism sometimes stems from the fact that exercises are rarely held without advance 
notice and tend to escalate progressively, rather than erupting suddenly on a broad 
scale. Sudden-onset incidents present a particular challenge for which responders need 
better preparation. One expert described his concern this way:  
As incidents escalate progressively in front of us, we build and add systems. We 
do this naturally. But what happens when the incident starts out big and 
requires a large system right out of the gate? We don’t know how to handle 
instantaneously large, complex incidents. We go in thinking “I can handle this.” 
We don’t go in thinking “I’m overwhelmed from the get-go.” 
Finally, a major impediment to exercising is fear of failure – not in reality, but in the 
exercise. Our response experts told us that most exercises have a punitive tone. Exercise 
designers and evaluators have some “school solution” in mind that is never revealed to 
exercise participants. The participants do not understand in advance what the 
expectations are for success and the exercise objectives are unclear. As a result, 
participants make obscure decisions during the exercise, for which they are later 
criticized. This has occurred often enough that responders are reticent about 
participating in exercises. One senior manager explained the problem this way:  
We exercise wrong. People don’t come to exercises because they’re afraid they’ll 
be tested, that they’ll make mistakes, and that they’ll be embarrassed. They make 
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strange decisions that cause the exercise to veer off. We don’t train people how to 
operate first and then test them afterwards. Instead, we throw them in blind, and 
then tear them apart afterwards. We just expect them to make the decision that 
we had anticipated and then criticize them when they don’t.  
This situation is not helped by the fact that exercises are often designed and delivered by 
contractors, whose interests may have more to do with business than with improving 
response performance in the field during a major incident. Our focus group participants 
fear that this punitive approach will only get worse if exercises become DHS’s main tool 
for assessment and funding allocation. 
There are also important imbalances in exercise goals and the content of exercise 
scenarios. Responders told us that the preoccupation with terrorism and WMD means 
that DHS mandates state and local governments to perform exercises they do not need, 
dealing with scenarios that are far down the list of likely events or do not focus on 
important capability gaps. In fact, a narrow focus on WMD is potentially damaging to 
our preparedness. There is only so much room on an agency’s training schedule. If 
WMD displaces too much, there is not enough time to focus on training to address 
lessons the field has identified. Even making room for the most pressing lessons is 
already hard. Our experts assert that state and local governments need to identify their 
greatest threat and weakest capability and define their own relevant exercise needs. 
Another common problem is that exercises have proliferated in light of events and 
studies highlighting weaknesses in preparedness. Not only are there too many exercises, 
there are too many goals for each one. As a result, locals are inundated with exercise 
requirements to the point that their participation is not productive. Our experts suggest 
fewer exercises with narrower and sharper objectives: “We are already exercised to 
death. More exercises is not the answer.” Finally, exercises fail to target one of the most 
important levers of preparedness: regional relationships. Agencies either exercise in 
isolation with simulated interactions, or the interactions that are required by an exercise 
do not mimic those that would operate in a real disaster. As a result, agencies fail to 
derive perhaps the most important benefit of the exercise process: relationships with 
other agencies, jurisdictions, and disciplines. 
Execution problems further undermine the value of exercises. A major problem is 
that many responders miss exercises, because they happen on a particular day and shift, 
and exercises of a particular type may happen only one time or once a year. So only 
some of the force gets the experience. Moreover, while the same agencies may 
participate together in several exercises, the participants vary from exercise to exercise. 
As a result, people have a “one-shot” experience and do not get a chance to learn from 
their mistakes and then try it again. Worse, uneven participation means that agencies 
miss the opportunity to build strong, trusting relationships. Finally, an important result 
of exercises is to expose deficiencies so that they can be examined and corrected, but 
fear of retribution or penalties impede honest reporting. Too often, public officials 
report wonderful successes and do not reveal problems. As a result, the public thinks 
everything is under control and has unrealistic expectations when a bad incident 
actually happens and agencies do not get the resources they need to correct problems.  
 
Resource Constraints 
Commitment to learning is wasted if resources are not available to support the process. 
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Unfortunately, funds available to sustain corrective action, training, and exercise 
programs are even leaner than those available for staff and equipment. One chief asked, 
“Even if we read every AAR, where do we get capacity to implement lessons in our 
organizations?” Part of the problem is that investments in basic capacity are not as 
marketable – as “sexy” – as equipment for combating terrorism. Furthermore, carefully 
conceived, sophisticated, progressive training and exercise programs are very expensive 
in time and dollars. Unlike the military, which spends a great deal of time training when 
they are not actually fighting, emergency responders have many other ancillary duties 
aside from responding to calls. Response agencies cannot pull personnel off the line or 
off these duties for training and exercises. And, our experts admitted, we shouldn’t be 
investing resources in training and exercises unless we make the effort to improve our 
lessons-learning processes. “If you don’t get the lessons right,” they say, “you chase 
hollow solutions and throw money around without actually solving problems.” 
To synthesize our findings, we believe the fundamental challenge is that it takes 
long-term resource commitment and organizational discipline to solve recurring 
problems. Too often, however, political support is too transient as other, more visible, 
concerns divert resources from longer-term preparedness activities. Even in the 
emergency response domain, attention devoted to terrorism distracts from developing 
the basic capacity needed to respond to more common incidents. Agencies are easily 
distracted by their daily missions, as well. Because lessons from major incidents are not 
easily accessible, are not detailed enough to be useful, and their relevance is not 
immediately obvious, agencies are reticent about committing the time and effort needed 
to really understand, develop, and implement corrective actions that would improve 
their performance. Even if they do decide to adopt new procedures, inadequate practice 
prevents transitional changes from taking hold. Further, those changes most likely to 
become embedded are smaller internal adjustments, rather than broad culture changes 




We asked our participants for ideas to improve our ability to learn the lessons of the 
past. Their ideas centered around three themes. 
 1.  The need to radically improve the way we train and exercise.  
2. The need for a comprehensive, nation-wide capability to gather and validate the 
information we learn from incidents, develop and vet corrective actions, and 
disseminate them to those who must inculcate the changes. 
3. The need for incentives to institutionalize lessons-learning processes at all levels of 
government.  
 
Training and Exercising 
Across the board, our study participants felt the key to learning lessons is to improve the 
way we train and exercise. Most importantly, exercises must be recast as learning 
activities targeted at improving performance, not as punitive tests where failure is 
perceived as threatening an organization’s ability to garner funding or maintain political 
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favor. This requires improvements in exercise planning. In particular, exercise planners 
should explicitly link the lessons a jurisdiction seeks to learn to a limited set of focused 
exercise objectives, rather than trying to accomplish numerous ill-defined goals. Our 
participants recommended that exercise planning should follow the military-style crawl 
 walk  run structure where participants first learn expectations about appropriate 
actions and decisions (crawl), then move slowly through a scenario taking the time to 
practice decision making (walk), and then pick up the pace and the challenges as they 
get more adept (run). This suggests that responders should engage in smaller, more 
frequent, narrowly tailored exercises with limited goals before they get to exercises on 
the scale of TOPOFF. An exercise program with this sophisticated, progressive structure 
is resource-intensive and will require federal support. DHS should reorient and enhance 
their exercise planning resources to help state and local agencies plan and execute 
exercises that fulfill these goals. 
The participants offered advise for their own agencies as well, beginning with 
making training for large-scale events tougher. While the table-top exercises commonly 
employed provide valuable practice with strategic and tactical decision making, they are 
not realistic enough to test jurisdictions’ abilities to coordinate resources and 
communicate with each other. We must find a way to introduce the chaos and common 
failures likely in a real event into state, regional, and local exercises. And local agencies 
need to find a way to inculcate practice with the protocols and behaviors suggested by 
lessons in daily activities. For example, jurisdictions that explicitly set up incident 
commands for every event they respond to – even the small ones – are better able to 
inculcate this way of operating as a habit responders will draw on during major 
incidents when it is especially necessary.  
Finally, individual agencies also need to do a better job of adopting disciplined 
processes for reporting lessons and updating plans to reflect them, so that lessons, 
planning, training, and exercising can be better integrated. None of the lessons  
identified in this study as recurring are hazard-specific. They arise from incidents of all 
types. This suggests that even though disasters seem unique, solutions to them can be 
generalized. Most experienced incident managers will tell you that the best way to make 
a decision in an emergency is to make it well ahead of time, before an incident happens 
and before the specific nature of the problems that will arise is known. This suggests two 
things: first, that an all-hazards perspective is appropriate and should be emphasized, 
and second, that many of the issues that will arise from an incident of any type can be 
addressed in a rigorous planning process. To support lessons-focused planning, 
agencies must establish and follow a requirement to document events and lessons 
learned immediately post-operation, for small events as well as large incidents. 
Adopting a standard format for this process will make it easier for responders to follow 
this mandate. Agencies must also require that lessons learned (both theirs and other 
organizations’) are consulted and considered as plans are revised. To assist this process, 
the incident managers in our study see an important role for the federal government in 
creating a national capability to identify and advocate lessons learned. 
 
National Emergency Response Lessons Learned Institute 
Learning lessons depends on the development of a robust analytical capability. Such a 
capability could be the core of a new national doctrinal institute or part of an existing 
federal academy or preparedness activity. Any of these arrangements would be a 
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significant undertaking, however, and would not succeed as simply an “additional duty” 
of an existing organization. Analysts who support this institution would need to be able 
to understand the information in AAR’s, translate them into a common language, 
identify and resolve conflicting information or conclusions, develop the required 
changes in policy and procedure, vet or test those new concepts, and deliver them to the 
organizations who need them. This would require analysts with both expertise in 
learning science and in-depth knowledge and experience in the emergency response and 
incident management domains.  
For this institute (whatever its configuration) to be effective, it must begin by 
promulgating a sound reporting system. Good reporting is demanding and resource-
intensive; it requires clear criteria for what is to be reported, a standardized reporting 
process, a robust and secure data management capacity, and a user-friendly interface. A 
universal national reporting methodology would help response organizations 
understand what they should include in their reports so that they will be useful tools for 
learning and change. A common format would make it easier for agencies to understand 
each other’s reports. 
Once reports are submitted, the institute’s analysts could work on understanding the 
lessons indicated in reports in order to consolidate findings and develop proposed 
procedural changes and alternatives, additions to doctrine, or new concepts of 
operations. Then, the institute should use sophisticated information technology to make 
their findings easily available across response disciplines. Tools such as databases with 
smart search engines, electronic update bulletins, and web-based training, should be 
employed so that responders could easily find information relevant to their missions, 
disciplines, service responsibilities, and hazard environments. Just creating a database 
will not be enough, however. It must be broadly recognized across response disciplines 
as a definitive, comprehensive, and valid information source. To ensure the ideas, 
information, and proposals generated by the institute are trusted by the response 
community, a peer review process to validate the lessons and ensure the proposed 
solutions are legal, workable, and effective is essential. 
Also essential are activities to push important information out to users proactively 
and regularly through several modes and in a variety of forums. As examples, safety 
bulletins and time-sensitive alerts should be rapidly disseminated. A system akin to the 
National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (NLETS) and other messaging 
systems currently used by police agencies could be effective. The institute should also 
have a regular publication and submit articles and columns in established emergency 
response trade journals. The institute should sponsor broad, multi-disciplinary, lessons-
focused conferences. Finally, the institute should conduct senior leadership training 
forums that focus not only on lessons that need to be learned but on how to learn them. 
A crucial concern when developing an effective lessons analysis institute is liability. 
For a lessons reporting and dissemination system to have integrity requires that those 
who report be protected from retribution. Absent this protection, reports cannot be 
specific enough to be useful. If lessons databases are fodder for lawsuits, jurisdiction 
attorneys may prohibit participation. The need for a high level of protection argues for 
enactment of such a system in legislation that assures immunity from Freedom of 
Information Act requests and restricts the use of reports in lawsuits, regulatory 
enforcement, or personnel actions. There are models for how a system like this could 
work. For example, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a joint NASA-FAA 
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initiative that collects, analyzes, and responds to voluntarily submitted aviation safety 
incident reports in order to lessen the likelihood of aviation accidents. Pilots, air traffic 
controllers, flight attendants, mechanics, ground personnel, and others involved in 
aviation operations submit reports to the ASRS when they are involved in, or observe, 
an incident or situation in which aviation safety was compromised. All submissions are 
voluntary and reports sent to the ASRS are confidential. The FAA has committed not to 
use ASRS information against reporters in enforcement actions.8 Another example that 
demonstrates how this might be developed for the emergency response community is 
the National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System, which is intended to be a 
voluntary, confidential, non-punitive, and secure reporting system targeted at 
improving firefighter safety by sharing the details of unintentional unsafe occurrences. 
It is currently funded by grants from the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Firefighters Grant Program and the Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company.9 
 
Incentives 
The incident commanders who participated in our study pointed out that discussions of 
lessons are moot unless they can be disseminated to the grass-roots level nationwide so 
that line responders can adopt them. They noted that it is important to recognize that 
people respond to incentives – that is, line troops will change their behavior to reap 
rewards or avoid punishment. Currently, fear of retribution drives responders away 
from participating in exercises or reporting their mistakes, for example. We need to 
develop incentives that cause regions and localities to support and promote lessons 
reporting, change, and learning. One obvious approach is to make federal and state 
funding contingent on developing and using lessons-learning systems. This kind of 
“carrot” can work. For instance, Fire Act and SAFER grants require that agencies 
participate in the National Fire Incident Reporting System for the grant year and three 
subsequent years. This is one possible model.  
In order to achieve broad consistency, our participants argue that it is important to 
promote a regional commitment to identifying problems and adopting best practices. 
They believe that local agencies were “more likely to adopt and indoctrinate lessons if 
the people they work with every day across a region are doing the same thing.” 
Identifying appropriate regions is not a trivial task, however. Who constitutes the “right” 
set of local collaborators depends on the characteristics of the prospective participant 
jurisdictions, the resources they have available, and the hazards they face. Successful 
regions cannot be imposed arbitrarily; they should be formed according to some 
commonality identified locally. This will be especially challenging when natural regions 
cross state lines. Regionalization could be enabled by enhancing (and in some cases 
fixing) existing regional processes and mechanisms (e.g. Local Emergency Planning 
Committees and State Authorizing Authorities). Regional response plans could be a 
prerequisite for receiving funds from a regionally-targeted preparedness grant program. 





The fact that challenges to learning lessons persist, despite regular experience with 
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them, is a serious concern. In today’s environment, where the emergency response 
mission space is expanding dramatically to include broader homeland security 
responsibilities, the ability to capitalize on experience and improve capacity is ever more 
important. But organizations cannot just be told to “change.” Enduring change needs to 
address the structure, system, and culture of an organization so that patterns of 
behavior can be adjusted. Truly institutionalizing a new process requires long-term 
commitment. This is what makes learning processes especially vulnerable: there are too 
many short-term distracters. Other political priorities, sensational concerns like 
terrorism, workforce turnover, other concurrent organizational change efforts, and daily 
missions all conspire to derail organizational transition. As a practical matter, then, the 
main problem with lesson learning can be seen as a lack of will and commitment, rather 
than a lack of ability. If lessons learned become a priority for leaders – especially local 
leaders who will be called to manage disasters directly – then lessons learned have a 
better chance of becoming a priority for everybody. Moreover, this commitment needs 
to be vertical; federal agencies must also commit to identifying and learning the lessons 
that are relevant to them. As one responder put it, “You can fix all the wagons locally, 
but if the wheels fall off FEMA’s wagon, the system fails.”  
An additional conclusion is that most big lessons are inter-agency lessons. Learning 
them requires learning within and across agencies. It is not enough for agencies to try to 
learn these kinds of lessons in isolation. Despite its profound advantages, federalism 
gets in our way: we have national, state, and local governments but few robust regional 
forums for decision-making. Our system lacks substantial support and incentives for 
regional (multi-state within the nation, or multi-local within and across states) activities 
and for broad integration across the response disciplines. Disasters are regional – they 
do not recognize jurisdictional boundaries or disciplinary parochialism. Our systems for 
learning from disasters must therefore span these barriers. 
Another key observation is that, as one reviewer of this article pointed out to us, 
much of what after action reports focus on is tactical, operational, and retrospective in 
nature. Reports tend to offer relatively little insight into the more strategic dimensions 
of disasters, and do not tend to take a prospective view of what can be done to prevent 
them. Our purpose in this article has been to consider how well we learn from our 
experiences, with the contention that it is by learning from successes and mistakes that 
we can be better prepared to act when something else happens. Yet, we also believe that 
prevention is an important (and often ignored) goal. This suggests two things: first, 
those who prepare reports often forego the opportunity to comment on how to avoid 
problems altogether (rather than contending with consequences); and second, further 
research is warranted to understand learning in the context of prevention (as opposed to 
response). 
Finally, from an academic perspective, focused research can improve our 
understanding of how to make lesson learning work well. Immediate research 
opportunities include more rigorous textual and content analysis of the AAR’s to 
validate our suggestive findings, to identify causal processes (understanding of which 
may enhance learning), and to understand the differences in perspectives that emerge 
across all agencies participating in the same incident. Researchers should bring the 
learning science and social psychology literature to bear on developing approaches to 
effective learning tailored to the challenges of preparedness and emergency response. In 
short, helping organizations navigate the complexities of lessons learning should be 
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informed by the substantial academic literature that has developed around this issue. A 
brief synopsis of some key insights is included in Appendix C for reference. 
The very real consequence of failing to learn lessons is loss of lives and property. In 
short, as one responder told us: “If we don’t learn these lessons, people are going to die 
again, because we failed to fix the problems that killed people the last time.” We should 
not belittle the magnitude of this challenge, however; problems recur because they are 
inherently very difficult to solve. If solutions were evident, emergency response 
professionals would have adopted them long ago. This should motivate agencies in all 
emergency response disciplines and at all levels of government to give serious attention 
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APPENDIX C: LITERATURE ON LEARNING AND CHANGE 
This paper is about how emergency responders can more ably recognize flaws in past behavior 
and implement new behaviors that will result in better outcomes in the future. In short, we are 
concerned with learning and change. These are complex fields of theory and research. A brief 
review of some established insights from the literature is instructive.  
Fiol and Lyles define learning as “the development of insights, knowledge, and associations 
between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions.”10 Learning is multi-
dimensional: it has cognitive, behavioral, and emotional components, each of which is 
susceptible to particular instructional or educational approaches.11 The cognitive domain 
involves the attainment of knowledge and the development of intellectual skill. Rudimentary 
learning in this domain includes information acquisition and comprehension, while 
sophisticated learning involves synthesis and evaluation. The affective domain deals with 
emotional intelligence or the emergence of attitudes, values, and feelings associated with a 
particular phenomenon. Receiving and responding to these phenomena are at the lowest levels 
of learning, while organizing and internalizing values associated with the phenomena are at the 
highest levels. The behavioral domain involves learning that requires physical activity, ranging 
from simply observing an activity to adapting the skill to new purposes or origination of new 
action. 
It is evident that learning is an individual-level activity – people use their brains to observe, 
think, reason, and develop new insights. But since the early 1970s it has been understood that 
learning also occurs at the collective level. That is, organizations can be considered to learn 
when they acquire, process, store, and distribute knowledge, understanding, techniques, and 
practices.12 Organization theorists have long discussed how learning is shaped by the use of 
routines to guide behavior. Levitt and March summarize this body of thought as follows: 
Organizations depend on accepted routines (operational rules, procedures, and conventions that 
may be formal or informal). That is, they tend to follow habits believed to be appropriate to their 
circumstances, rather than selecting actions to achieve a particular result. These routines 
develop incrementally over time as a result of past experience, rather than consciously in 
anticipation of future conditions. Organizations adjust their routines based on successive 
comparison between outcome targets and the outcome levels they actually achieve. Thus, 
historical experience and established routine profoundly shape organizational learning.13 From 
these insights, Levitt and March draw the important conclusion that “Organizations are seen as 
learning by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior…The experiential 
lessons of history are captured by routines in a way that makes the lessons, but not the history, 
accessible to organizations and organizational members who have not themselves experienced 
the history.”14  
Organizational behavior (routines) change as errors develop in the organization’s collective 
memory, as new experiences or the experiences of other organizations threaten the veracity of 
organizational beliefs about what is appropriate, and as the results of organizational activities 
diverge from desired or expected outcomes. As a result, organizations adjust their behavior. 
Meyer terms this adjustment “adaptation,” and suggests that adaptation takes two forms: 
deviation-reducing (where adjustments are made based upon existing organizational 
assumptions) and deviation-amplifying (where adjustments use new causal relationships 
founded on revised assumptions).15 To the extent that organizations must revise their 
assumptions, learning is fundamentally about changing culture, where an organization’s culture 
is its system of shared values, perceptions of work, and perceptions of success.16 To establish 
culture, assumptions are made and tested. When they are upheld, they become embedded 
(“frozen,” in Lewin’s classic conceptualization).17 Culture change occurs when assumptions are 
challenged. Alternatives are proposed and tested, and if they are upheld repeatedly, adjustments 
may be made to adopt these alternatives. While this process of examining and revising 
assumptions is tacit, its effects are practical: for new organizational approaches to be upheld, 
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organization members must find them credible and witness short-term “wins.” In short, lesson 
learning can require culture change.  
An important question is what kind of change is warranted in light of what has been learned. 
An appreciation of the change process can help managers understand how to instigate and 
sustain it.18 Ackerman distinguishes three types of change.19 The simplest form of change – and 
a process that organizations commonly and comfortably use – is developmental change, which 
can be thought of as an incremental process of improvement and increasing sophistication. This 
form of change involves adjusting, enhancing, or correcting what already exists. It generally 
targets skills or methods that fall short of expectations or requirements. At the other extreme, 
the most difficult and disruptive kind of change is transformational change. This is radical 
change typically prompted by some shock to the organizational system that challenges the 
organization’s assumptions about environmental demands, resulting in a period of chaos from 
which an entirely new culture or way of doing business emerges. 
An intermediate form of change is transitional change, where an organization discards its 
old ways of accomplishing its work in favor of new processes.20 Transitional change is planned, 
defined by movement to a known state. Typically an organization continues to use its existing 
process, but becomes increasingly dissatisfied with this process, either because it doesn’t work 
well or it becomes known that something else works better. The organization develops a new 
process, which it then begins to “try out” in parallel with its old process. During this period of 
overlap, an organization works in its old process but may increasingly dip into the new process. 
As the organization gets comfortable and confident, it ultimately switches to the new process. 
But, if it doesn’t have long or strong commitment, a difficult event may cause the organization to 
revert to its old habits. 
What do these insights about learning and change suggest about why change in response to 
lessons identified from disasters is so hard? Developing a sustainable sense of commitment to a 
new process requires a persistent sense of urgency about change and improvement, but other 
political exigencies may overwhelm commitment to emergency response. Since disasters are 
infrequent, agencies do not have reason to adjust their operating assumptions, and lack 
continuous opportunities to test out and embed new processes. In effect, organizations will stick 
with their accepted routines, absent persistent challenges to their assumptions or feedback 
about their performance relative to desired outcomes. This problem is made harder when an 
agency is asked to consider a new process that comes, not out of its own experience, but from 
someone else’s. Levitt and March tell us that organizations can capture the learning of other 
organizations through the transfer of encoded experience, though the mechanisms of diffusion 
(shared learning through a network) are even more complex than at the level of a single 
organization.21 Thus we can anticipate that, absent an explicit strategy to learn and change, the 
emergence of improved behaviors may be slowed or even obstructed. 
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